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Abstract
The importance of social trust on economic growth has been suggested by many
empirical works. This paper formalizes the concept of social trust and studies its for-
mation process in a game theoretic setting. It provides plausible explanations for a
wide range of empirical and experimental findings. The main results of the paper are
as follows. For utility-maximizing players, cooperation arises in one-period prisoner’s
dilemmas if and only if there is social trust. The amount of social trust in a given
game is determined by the distribution of players’ cooperative tendency. Cooperative
tendency is in essence a component of human capital distinct from cognitive ability.
Its investment, however, is typically not eﬃcient because the social returns are always
strictly larger than individual returns. This positive investment externality leads to
multiple equilibria in social trust formation, but a unique stable equilibrium may also
exist. The diﬀerent eﬀects of legal institutions, information structure and education
programs on social trust are also investigated. (JEL Z13, J24)
1 Introduction
The importance of social trust in economy was suggested long ago by Arrow (1972, p.357):
“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the
economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” In
recent years social trust, as an important form of social capital, has attracted the attention
∗I am grateful to George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and Rafael Rob for their support. I also thank
Hanming Fang, Mokoto Hanazono, Volker Nocke, Dan Silverman, and Huanxing Yang for comments and
suggestions. All remaining errors are mine.
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of many economists as well as other social scientists.1 For example, several empirical works
show that the average trusting level in a society is significantly associated with economic
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), and has large positive eﬀects on the performance of
various organizations (La Porta et al., 1997).
The formal (economic) analysis of social trust, however, is lagging behind and answers
to many basic questions about social trust are still elusive. For example, what is the
relationship between trustworthiness, trust, and social trust? What is the unique role of
social trust in promoting cooperation compared with other forces such as reputation? How
does social trust vary across games and players? How can one account for the discrepancies
or even contradictions among diﬀerent empirical measures of social trust? How is social trust
formed in society? What are the roles of education systems, mass media, social networks,
and legal institutions in the formation of social trust? Is the social trust level in a society
eﬃcient? Is it history dependent? How is it related to human capital?
Motivated by these questions, this paper formalizes several trust-related concepts, and
studies the formation of social trust in a game theoretic setting. Note that the concept of
trust is vacuous without discrepancies between social and individual returns, since otherwise
rational people can always be ‘trusted’ to choose their optimal actions. And social trust is
typically referred to as trust among strangers instead of acquaintances involved in repeated
interactions, or the residual trust unexplained by these arrangements (Hardin 2002). So a
one-period prisoner’s dilemma seems to be an ideal context to formalize social trust.
People in general diﬀer in their predisposition to cooperate, i.e., they have diﬀerent
cooperative tendencies (Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997). In a one-period prisoner’s dilemma,
players with suﬃciently high (low) cooperative tendencies will cooperate (defect) regardless
of their partner’s action, while those in the middle behave in a reciprocal way. A player’s
trustworthiness in a game can be defined as the probability that he will cooperate in it.
1Parallel to physical and human capital, the term ‘social capital’ is created to represent the cooperative
infrastructure of a society (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993, 1995). It often refers to features of social orga-
nization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual
benefit (Putnam, 1995).
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So the same player may exhibit diﬀerent levels of trustworthiness across games; those with
higher cooperative tendencies are more trustworthy. How much trust we have in a player
is equal to his trustworthiness. The social trust among a group of players is the expected
trustworthiness of a typical member, which is determined by the distribution of cooperative
tendency among players besides relevant game features. Its amount may vary across games
and players, which explains why there are discrepancies in social trust measures based on
surveys and experiments (Glaeser et al., 2000).
The eﬀects of social trust in generating cooperation can be amplified by repeated in-
teractions among players. In finitely repeated games, social trust is a necessary condition
for the existence of reputation eﬀects among utility-maximizing players. Indeed, the crucial
types typically assumed in the reputation literature, for example, the tit-for-tat type in
Kreps et al. (1982), the honest one in Tirole (1996) and Dixit (2003), and the reciprocal
one in Fehr and Gachter (2000), are simply special cases of trustworthy players. In this
sense, social trust among players serves as a solid base for reputations to build on.
As an idiosyncratic feature of individuals, a cooperative tendency is often costly to
cultivate and may generate returns in the future. It is, in essence, a component of human
capital that is distinct from cognitive skills. The cooperative tendency enables a player
to cooperate more and get higher returns for his cognitive skills, while it also competes
with cognitive skills for resources at human capital investment stage. For players with low
investing cost in cooperative tendency, being trustworthy would increase their cognitive
skills than remaining selfishness. Investment in a cooperative tendency, however, is not
eﬃcient because social returns are always strictly larger than individual returns. This
positive externality implies that equilibrium social trust levels are typically not optimal,
and there exist multiple equilibria. In the benchmark case where individual returns are
moderate and quite similar among players, a negligible diﬀerence in initial beliefs may lead
the economy to either ‘no trust’ or ‘full trust’ stable equilibrium. In contrast, there is only
one stable equilibrium when individual returns are diverse.
When investing costs are reduced by education systems, or when the observability of
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cooperative tendency is improved by information structure (including mass media and social
networks), both social trust and average cooperative tendency increase. In contrast, when
legal institutions and monitoring reduce the benefits of defecting, social trust levels in
relevant situations are increased, but individuals’ internal discipline may be crowded out.
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2000) are among the first economists that formally
studied social capital formation. The current paper diﬀers from theirs in a couple of im-
portant aspects. First, they model individual investment decisions as isolated optimization
problems. In contrast, we adopt a game theoretic setting and an equilibrium approach to
study social trust formation, which is consistent with Coleman’s (1988) insight that social
capital "exists in the relations among persons." Indeed, strong externalities among players
may be the defining feature of social capital. Second, we focus on social trust alone rather
than bundle diﬀerent forms of social capital together as a homogenous subject. Social cap-
ital is arguably an umbrella concept whose many manifestations diﬀer substantially from
and interact with each other. They share the same name ‘social capital’ because all of
them belong to the not yet well-appreciated social forces that constitute the cooperative
infrastructure of our society. It seems that social trust best captures the essence of social
capital and the rigorous study of social trust may be the key to eventually understand other
social capital forms.
Rob and Zemsky (2002) study the eﬀects of incentive structures in a firm on social trust
among employees. They find that diﬀerent corporate cultures can be caused purely by
ex ante diﬀerences in employees’ cooperative tendencies. The current paper complements
their work in that it focuses on individual optimal choices and endogenizes cooperative
tendencies and social trust in a society. In this aspect it is similar to the work of Frank
(1987) that studies the endogenous choice of being honest by selfish players. There are
several diﬀerences, however. For example, the cooperative tendency as a continuous variable
is more general than the binary trait of honest and selfish; its relationship with social trust
and human capital, which is the focus of this paper, is not mentioned at all by Frank.
From the perspective of the human capital literature (Heckman, 2000; Bowles et al.,
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2001), this paper provides new evidence that non-cognitive skills, including incentive-
enhancing preferences, are important determinants of individual earnings. It also detects
large positive externalities in cooperative tendency investment, which may account for the
shortage of appropriate working attitudes among employees in many firms (Cappelli, 1995).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section cooperative tendency and social
trust are formally defined and investigated in various games. A simple social trust formation
model is developed in section three, where players’ cooperative tendencies are chosen (by
their parents) to maximize their life time utility. The final section presents conclusions.
2 The Formalization of Social Trust
There is a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Agents are randomly paired to play
the following one-shot prisoners’ dilemma:
player j
player i
C D
C (g, g) (−l, g + d)
D (g + d,−l) (0, 0)
where C is cooperate or exert eﬀort, D is defect or not exert eﬀort. g, l, and d are pay-
oﬀs or material outputs for players, where g and l represent respectively gain and loss of
cooperative behavior, while d is for extra gain from defecting. We make the following two
assumptions
d < l, (1)
g + d− l > 0, (2)
which are quite standard in relevant literature (Kreps et al 1982, Rotemberg 1994, Bar-Gill
and Fershtman 2000). The first assumption generates reciprocal behaviors.2 Together with
the second one, it guarantees that cooperative behaviors always increase total payoﬀs.
2Note that d and l represent a player’s marginal costs of cooperating when his partner cooperates and
defects, respectively. A similar analysis is by Dixit (2003).
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2.1 Cooperative Tendency
The utility of player i matched with a partner j is
ui(Ai, Aj) = mi(Ai, Aj)| {z }
game-specific
− αiχD(Ai)| {z }
player-specific
,
where Ai, Aj ∈ {C,D} are the actions of player i and j; mi(Ai, Aj) ∈ {g, g+ d,−l, 0} is the
game-specific payoﬀ for player i; χD(Ai) is an index function such that
χD(Ai) =
(
1 if Ai = D
0 if Ai = C.
.
αi ∈ R+ is the amount of disutility player i incurs when defecting, which measures player
i’s taste for cooperation, or cooperative tendency. It is an internal discipline against defect-
ing that may enable players to cooperate in situations where cooperation is otherwise not
chosen.3 Players have heterogenous cooperative tendencies such that αi ∼ F (·), where F (·)
is a cumulative distribution function.
Each player’s payoﬀ from the game is thus composed of two parts: mi(Ai, Aj) is game-
specific and constant across players, while αiχD(Ai) is player-specific and stable across
games.4 These two components are explicitly modeled here to highlight two distinct ways
of inducing cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas (James 2002). The conventional way changes
game-specific payoﬀs by embedding a dilemma in a bigger game. For example, appropriate
rewards and punishments associated with repeated interactions can transform a stand-alone
prisoner’s dilemma to a new game where cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium. A second
way modifies player-specific payoﬀs in that people may care about things other than narrow
selfish payoﬀs (e.g. Frank 1987, Kandel and Lazear 1992, Rotemberg 1994, Bar-Gill and
3This utility function is motivated by the experimental finding that warm-glow eﬀects are highly sig-
nificant in inducing cooperation in public good games (Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997). It does not make any
diﬀerence in this section if we model cooperative tendency as an intrinsic benefit to cooperation. But it
may cause unnecessary technical complication in the next section when individuals have to decide how much
cooperative tendency they would invest, since they may want to invest in cooperative tendency per se to
simply feel good, rather than as a valuable asset enabling them to cooperate in a productive way.
4Accordingly, the payoﬀs associated with the same actions in the above prisoner’s dilemma diﬀer across
players. To avoid confusion and be consistent with the standard usage in literature, we call a game a
prisoner’s dilemma if it is so for players with zero cooperative tendency.
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Fershtman 2000). As long as these ‘special’ preferences can be observed and/or intentionally
cultivated in reality, this way would yields insightful and refutable results as well.
2.2 Trustworthiness, Trust, Social Trust
Fix a one-period prisoner’s dilemma game. Players with diﬀerent cooperative tendencies
can be categorized into three behavioral types: the selfish if he always defects, the selfless
if he always cooperates, and the reciprocal if he makes in-kind responses to his partner’s
action.5 The latter two types are also called cooperative or non-selfish.
The trustworthiness of a player in the game is the probability that he would cooperate
in it. Selfish (selfless) players have zero (full) trustworthiness since they never (always)
cooperate; the trustworthiness of a reciprocal player is zero (one) if matched with a selfish
(cooperative) partner. How much trust a player has in his partner is equal to the latter’s
trustworthiness. So all players have no (full) trust in a selfish (selfless) partner. A coop-
erative player will trust a reciprocal partner, but a selfish one will not. Social trust in a
group is equal to the expected trustworthiness of a typical member, which is determined by
the distribution of cooperative tendency F (·) and specific game features such as defecting
benefits and information structure. It can be characterized by the proportions of reciprocal
and selfless players.
2.3 Social Trust in Various Games
This section studies the levels of social trust and its eﬀects on outputs in various games.
Specifically it proves the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Fix the distribution of cooperative tendency in population. In one-period
prisoner’s dilemmas cooperation arises if and only if there is social trust among players. In
finitely repeated games, social trust is a necessary condition for reputation eﬀects. Social
trust varies across games, decreasing in defecting benefits d and l. The total output strictly
increases with social trust.
5Many experimental studies have found that between 40 and 66 percent of subjects exhibit reciprocal
behaviors, while between 20 and 30 act completely selfish (Fehr and Gachter 2000).
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2.3.1 One-period Complete Information Game
Suppose cooperative tendencies are observed publicly. The one-period game between player
Ann with cooperative tendency αA and player Mike with αM is:
Mike
Ann
C D
C (g, g) (−l , g + d− αM)
D (g + d− αA,−l) (−αA,−αM)
Proposition 2 In the above one-period complete information game, i) players with cooper-
ative tendencies in the ranges [0, d), [d, l), and (l,+∞) are of selfish, reciprocal, and selfless
type, respectively; ii) (C,C) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both players are non-selfish.
Proof. i) When Mike plays C, Ann will play C iﬀ g ≥ g + d − αA ⇔ αA ≥ d holds.
When Mike plays D, Ann will play C iﬀ αA ≥ l holds. So Ann’s best response is: always
defect when αA < d; always cooperate when αA ≥ l; reciprocate otherwise. Since the game
is symmetric, Mike has the same best response function. ii) Since selfless players always
cooperate and reciprocal players always reciprocate with cooperative behaviors, (C,C) is a
Nash equilibrium when both players are non-selfish. Since a selfish player never plays C,
(C,C) can not be a Nash equilibrium if at least one players is selfish.
Let πRC denote the proportion of the reciprocal type under complete information and
πSC the selfless type. Then πRC = Pr(d ≤ αi < l) = F (l) − F (d), πSC = Pr(αi ≥ l) =
1 − F (l) by proposition 2. When players are randomly matched with each other, social
trust is πSC from a selfish players’ perspective, and (πRC + πSC) for non-selfish players.
It is obvious that πSC decreases with l and (πRC + πSC) decreases with d. The expected
outputs are πSC(g + d), (πRC + πSC)g and (πRC + πSC)(g + l)− l respectively for selfish,
reciprocal,6 and selfless players, all strictly increasing with social trust πSC or (πRC+πSC).
6Note that (D,D) is another Nash equilibrium when both players are reciprocal. However, each player
can unilaterally avoid (D,D) by always playing C since the partner is known to be reciprocal. So individual
utility maximization will essentially eliminate (D,D) and leaves the Pareto dominant (C,C) as the only NE
ever played between two reciprocal players.
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An alternative matching system is assortative matching where selfish players match with
each other and cooperative ones match among themselves. In this case, social trust is zero
among selfish players and one among cooperative players. The amount of social trust in the
whole group is (πRC + πSC). Since cooperative players each produce output g and selfish
ones zero, the total output is g(πRC + πSC), again strictly increasing in social trust.
2.3.2 One-period Incomplete Information Game
Under incomplete information players’ cooperative tendencies are private information. Let
πRI and πSI denote respectively the proportion of reciprocal and selfless type under in-
complete information and π the proportion of cooperative players in equilibrium. That is,
π ≡ πRI + πSI .
Proposition 3 In the one-period incomplete information game, the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium is “all players with αi ≥ πd+ (1− π)l play C, others play D,” where π is uniquely
determined by the equation π + F (πd+ (1− π)l) = 1. Furthermore, ∂π∂d < 0,
∂π
∂l < 0.
Proof. In this game the probability of a player matching with a cooperative partner
is believed to be π. By playing C, a player i gets g if her partner is cooperative, −l if
her partner defects. So her expected payoﬀ of playing C is πg − (1 − π)l. Similarly we
get that her expected utility of playing D is π(g + d − αi) − (1− π)αi. She will play C iﬀ
πg − (1− π)l ≥ π(g + d− αi)− (1− π)αi or αi ≥ πd+ (1− π)l holds.
For belief π to be consistent with players’ strategies, it must be true that π = Pr(αi ≥
πd+(1−π)l) ≡ 1−F (πd+(1−π)l). The RHS is continuous and increasing in π on the closed
interval [0, 1] because ∂RHS∂π = (l − d)DF ≥ 0. We also have RHS(π = 0) = 1 − F (l) ≥ 0
and RHS(π = 1) = 1 − F (d) ≤ 1, which implies that the slope at π is smaller than one,
i.e. (l− d)DF < 1. So π is uniquely determined in the interval [1−F (l), 1−F (d)] ⊆ [0, 1],
and it is stable. By the Implicit Function Theorem we have ∂π∂d = −
πdF
1−(l−d)dF < 0 and
∂π
∂l = −
(1−π)dF
1−(l−d)dF < 0.
Let α denote the minimum cooperative tendency for a player to become cooperative,
then α≡ πd + (1 − π)l. Proposition 3 implies that under incomplete information, players
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with αi < α are of selfish type, αi ∈ [α, l) reciprocal, while those with αi ≥ l are again
selfless. So we have πSI = 1− F (l), πRI ≡ F (l) − F (α). Social trust is now characterized
by π = πSI +πRI = 1−F (α), the proportion of cooperative players.7 The expected output
of a selfish player π(g + d) is higher than that of a cooperative player πg − (1− π)l. Both,
however, strictly increase with social trust π. And cooperative players get higher marginal
benefit from social trust.
2.3.3 T-period Incomplete Information Game
In one-shot games social trust improves output by enabling non-selfish players to cooperate
in situations that would otherwise be a prisoner’s dilemma. In repeated games social trust
can elicit cooperative behavior even from selfish players through reputation eﬀects. A
sequential equilibrium in a finite T-period game with incomplete information is characterized
below to illustrate interactions between social trust and repeated games. Suppose players
are randomly paired to play the above stage game for finite T ≥ 2 periods. Each pair lasts
T periods after they are matched. Their actions are observed at the end of each period. Let
β ∈ [0, 1] denote the time discount factor for all players. π and πRI are defined the same as
above.
Proposition 4 In this T-period game, the following strategy profile and belief system is a
sequential equilibrium if βπRI ≥ d(g+d) . The strategy profile is: (1) Selfless players always
play C. (2) Reciprocal players play C first; play C if (C,C) is played in the previous period,
play D otherwise. (3) Selfish players mimic reciprocal players until period T; play D at
period T. The belief system is: (1) In the first period and every period following the history
in which only (C,C) has been played, every player assigns probability π to his partner being
non-selfish. (2) In all the following periods after the first time (C,D) is observed, the player
who has played D is believed to be selfish. The player who has played C is still believed to
be non-selfish with probability π.
7Since l > α > d for all π ∈ [0, 1), we know 1− F (l) < 1− F (α) < 1− F (d), which implies πSC < π <
πSC + πRC . So compared with complete information, social trust under incomplete information is lower for
cooperative players, but higher for selfish players.
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Proof. In the appendix.
In this equilibrium all players cooperate until the last period when they behave according
to proposition 3. When we look at each period in isolation, it seems that repeated interac-
tions promote ‘trust’ among players. But the expected trustworthiness of players (and thus
the social trust) is always π on the equilibrium path. This discrepancy arises because there
are two diﬀerent sources of cooperation. One is trust based on the players’ cooperative
tendencies or goodwill. The other is the reputation eﬀect, i.e., the scheme of rewards and
punishments contingent on past behaviors, that makes cooperation appealing to a player’s
narrow selfish interests. So the true motivation for selfish players to cooperate is reputation
concerns, not that they have become more trustworthy. Note that without enough (pun-
ishment from) reciprocal players, the reputation eﬀect vanishes and selfish players will not
cooperate anymore.
In repeated games, these two sources of cooperation are often mixed together. In one-
shot games, however, cooperation arises only when there is trust among players. This is why
trust should be defined and measured in one-shot games, which helps disentangle diﬀerent
sources of cooperation. For example, when repeated interactions are stopped unexpectedly,
we can confidently predict that selfish players will not cooperate anymore, but non-selfish
ones will continue to cooperate. When there is no social trust, however, nobody would
cooperate in finitely repeated games. Since many institutions such as social networks and
norms involve repeated interactions, our analysis may shed light on how they interact with
social trust in promoting cooperation.
Another observation is that reciprocal players act similarly as tit-for-tat players in Kreps
et al.(1982); and selfless players act as the honest type in Frank (1987), Tirole (1997) and
Dixit (2003). In other words, our formulation of cooperative tendency naturally generate
these irrational behaviors for rational players. This suggests an innate link between social
trust and economic governance since the latter is aﬀected by the proportion of honest type
(Dixit 2003).
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2.4 Empirical Measures of Social Trust
Our formalization of social trust is quite useful in clarifying the relationship between various
empirical measures of social trust, especially when discrepancies among survey-based and
experiment-based measures are quite common (Glaeser et al. 2000b, Burlando and Hey
1997, Weimann 1994).
The widely used trust indicator TRUST is measured as below. The World Values
Surveys ask people the following trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
TRUSTC is equal to the percentage of respondents in country C replying “most people
can be trusted.” It exactly measures the amount of social trust in a country under some
assumptions described below. In daily life we often randomly meet each other in some one-
period prisoner’s dilemma, without knowing our partners’ individual cooperative tendencies.
Suppose in country C the representative dilemma is γC and the proportion of cooperative
players in equilibrium is πC . Players who have met a partner that can be trusted would
agree that “most people can be trusted.” Then TRUSTC = πC holds since exactly πC
proportion of players meet a trustworthy partner.
In a public goods experiment γP , suppose πP proportion of players cooperate. If the
distribution of cooperative tendency among the subjects is a random sample drawn from
the whole population, and γP is the same as the representative dilemma γC in country C,
then πP is an unbiased estimate of TRUSTC . If any of these assumptions are violated,
discrepancies among diﬀerent measures of social trust would inevitably arise.
3 Social Trust Formation
Suppose parents are able to teach children to become more cooperative by acting as role
models and choosing appropriate home and school inputs. How many of them would choose
to do so in equilibrium?8 Is the equilibrium social trust level optimal? If not, how can we
8General Social Surveys from 1986 to 1998 in the U.S. show that parents try to invest certain desirable
traits in children. For example, 77.2% of parents consider “help others when they need help” one of the
12
improve social trust? These issues are addressed in this section.
3.1 The Basic Model
Each player lives two periods. The first period is the investment stage where each player’s
cooperative tendency is chosen (by his parents) to maximize his life-time utility, taking as
given the expected proportion of cooperative players Π ∈ [0, 1] in the population.9 Investing
in cooperative tendency incurs positive cost. For example, parents have to repeatedly make
eﬀort in teaching children to share toys and be considerate. This task is easier when parents
are more skillful and the child is more obedient. Let the cost function be c(α, i), where
c(0, i) = 0, cα > 0, ci > 0, cαα ≥ 0, cαi ≥ 0. That is, the cost increases with player index i
and is convex in the cooperative tendency α.
The second period is the production stage. With probability 1− p, players’ cooperative
tendencies are private information and they randomly match each other to play the one-
period prisoner’s dilemma characterized by (g, d, l). With probability p, however, players’
cooperative tendencies are publicly observed10 and they are free to choose partners, playing
a one-period prisoner’s dilemma characterized by (G,D,L), where G ≥ g and D ≥ Πd +
(1−Π)l. In this environment, if a player ever invests, his cooperative tendency will be equal
to D which just enables him to cooperate in the complete information game (G,D,L).
Lemma 1 αi = D iﬀ αi > 0 for any i ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Players with α ≥ D cooperate in both games and get utility pG+ (1− p)[Πg −
(1−Π)l]. Since this payoﬀ does not depend on α and investing in α is costly, it is optimal
to choose the lowest possible level D. Players with α < Πd+(1−Π)l always defect and get
three most important traits that their children should learn.
9We assume a person’s cooperative tendency is fixed before adulthood, which is consistent with casual ob-
servation. Individuals’ trusting levels and trustworthiness may nonetheless change in accordance to diﬀerent
games, players and updated information (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).
10Mailath et al (2003) show that it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy
that does not play an equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty about types. In other words, a player’s
true type would ultimately be revealed by his actions. See also Frank (1987) for more reasons why p is
positive and an elaborate treatment of information structure.
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(1−p)Π(g+d)−pα. Their payoﬀs are maximized when α = 0. Any cooperative tendency in
the middle range makes players worse oﬀ than otherwise. Players with such an α cooperate
in game (g, d, l) but not in (G,D,L), getting payoﬀ (1 − p)[Πg − (1 − Π)l] − pα which is
worse than the cases of α = 0 and α = D.
We assume D = Πd+ (1−Π)l without much loss of generality. Let V (D, i) denote the
expected life-time utility for player i when he becomes cooperative, and V (0, i) if otherwise.
V (D, i) = βpG+ β(1− p)[Πg − (1−Π)l]− c(D, i),
V (0, i) = β(1− p)Π(g + d).
Let Vd(i,Π) represent the net return of investing in cooperative tendency v.s. remaining
selfish. By definition
Vd(i,Π) ≡ V (D, i)− V (0, i)
= βpG− β(1− p)[Πd+ (1−Π)l]− c(D, i).
Players will choose to invest if and only if Vd ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 ∂Vd(i,Π)∂i < 0,
∂Vd(i,Π)
∂Π > 0.
Proof. ∂Vd(i,Π)∂i = −ci < 0;
∂Vd(i,Π)
∂Π = β(1− p+ cD)(l − d) > 0.
The intuition is quite clear. Vd(i,Π) decreases with player index i because the investing
cost increases with it. A marginal increase of Π not only improves the chance of meeting a
cooperative player, but also reduces the minimum cooperative tendency (thus the investing
cost). Since cooperative players benefit more from both channels, the net return Vd(i,Π)
strictly increases with Π.
3.2 Positive Externality
Suppose the social planner’s objective function is to maximize the sum of all players’ life-
time utility:
max
π
V (π) =
Z iS
i=0
V (D, i)di+
Z 1
i=iS
V (0, i)di,
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where π is the proportion of cooperative players, and iS the highest index among them.
Then π = Pr(i ≤ iS) = iS, since i is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
Proposition 5 The social returns of investment in the cooperative tendency are strictly
larger than individual returns.
Proof. The first derivative of social welfare V (π) with respect to π is
dV
dπ
=
Z iS
i=0
∂V (D, i)
∂π
di+
Z 1
i=iS
∂V (0, i)
∂π
di| {z }
externality on others due to π increase
+ [V (D, iS)− V (0, iS)]| {z }
individual return for player iS
.
The social return of player iS investing in cooperative tendency is composed of two parts: the
individual return iS gets, and externalities of his investment on all others. The externalities
are positive because all players benefit from an increase in social trust: ∂V (D,i)∂π = β(1 −
p)(g + l) + cD(l − d) > 0, ∂V (0,i)∂π = β(1− p)(g + d) > 0. So the social return for any player
being non-selfish is always strictly larger than his individual return.
This proposition implies that individual investment in cooperative tendency is generally
not eﬃcient, which may explain why there is shortage of appropriate working habits and
attitudes in many firm (Cappelli 1995). Another implication is that equilibrium social trust
is always strictly lower than social optimal level, except when there is already full trust in
equilibrium.11
3.3 The Equilibrium
Now we study the existence and properties of Nash equilibrium (NE thereafter) at the
investment stage. Note that every NE can be characterized by a pair (Π = e, π = e),
e ∈ [0, 1], where π is the actual proportion of non-selfish players.12 And ‘no social trust’
11Though it is probable that full trust is the social optimal solution, this may not always be the case. For
example, if some players have extremely high investing costs, say higher than positive externalities received
by all others, then it is better that they remain selfish.
12Given all other players’ strategies (summarized by Π), player i invests in α if and only if Vd(i,Π) ≥ 0.
No player wants to deviate from this choice when the expected social trust is exactly realized, i.e. when
π = Π.
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equilibrium (Π = 0, π = 0) always exists since there is no gain from being the only co-
operative player. We partition the parameter space into four cases and characterize the
corresponding equilibria. We also check whether these NEs are stable to small perturba-
tions of Π.13
3.3.1 The Benchmark: Medium Cost Case
In this case the net returns of investing in cooperative tendency are quite similar across
players, not too high or too low. Specifically it is characterized by the following conditions
Vd(0,Π0) = 0, (3)
Vd(1,Π1) = 0. (4)
That is, there exist Π0,Π1 ∈ (0, 1) such that no players want to invest when Π ≤ Π0,
and all choose to invest when Π ≥ Π1. It is easy to prove Π0 < Π1. By Lemma 2 the
inequality Vd(1,Π0) < Vd(0,Π0) holds. But since Vd(0,Π0) = 0 = Vd(1,Π1), we have
Vd(1,Π0) < Vd(1,Π1), which implies Π0 < Π1 by Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 There is a unique solution i∗(Π) to Vd(i(Π),Π) = 0 for any Π ∈ [Π0,Π1]. i∗(Π)
strictly increases in Π.
Proof. By Lemma 2, Vd(i,Π) is continuous and strictly decreasing in i ∈ [0, 1] for any
Π. We also know Vd(0,Π) > 0 and Vd(1,Π) < 0 for any Π ∈ [Π0,Π1]. These two conditions
guarantee that for each Π ∈ [Π0,Π1], there exists a unique i∗ ≡ i∗(Π) ∈ [0, 1] such that
Vd(i∗(Π),Π) = 0. i∗(Π) strictly increases in Π since
∂i∗(Π)/∂Π = −(∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂Π)/(∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗) > 0
by Lemma 2.
This lemma implies that for any Π ∈ [Π0,Π1] all players with lower index than i∗(Π)
will choose to become cooperative while others will not. So the proportion of cooperative
13NEs can be considered as steady states in a dynamic process of countable infinite generations where the
expected social trust in every following generation is equal to the realized one in its immediate predecessor.
That is, ΠN+1 = πN ,∀N = 1, 2, .... where the initial one ΠN=1 is assumed exogenously given.
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players is π = B(Π) = Pr(i ≤ i∗(Π) = i∗(Π) since i is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. It is
trivial to show that B(Π) = 0 for any Π ∈ [0,Π0], and B(Π) = 1 for any Π ∈ [Π1, 1]. Thus
the best response function is
B(Π) ≡



0 if Π ∈ [0,Π0]
i∗(Π) if Π ∈ [Π0,Π1]
1 if Π ∈ [Π1, 1]
.
Since B(Π) is continuous, strictly increases in Π on [Π0,Π1], plus B(Π0) = 0 and B(Π1) = 1,
there must exist at least one fixed point Π∗ ∈ [Π0,Π1] such that i∗(Π∗) = Π∗. When B(Π)
has monotone slopes on the interval [Π0,Π1], an assumption we will maintain in this section,
the NE (Π = Π∗, π = Π∗) is unique.14 It is not stable since the slope of B(Π) is bigger than
one when crossing the 450 line. It is easy to check that (Π = 0, π = 0) and (Π = 1, π = 1)
are the other two NEs. Thus we have proved the following proposition.
Π
π
0 1
1
Π0 Π∗ Π1
B(Π)
Figure 1: Medium Cost Case
Proposition 6 Under conditions (3) and (4) there are three NEs: (0, 0), (Π∗,Π∗), and
14The exact number of fixed points on [Π0,Π1] depends on the curvature of i∗(Π), which is diﬃcult to
pindown in general. Note that ∂2i∗(Π)/∂Π2 = β(l− d)2[(1− p+ cα)ciα − cααci]/c2i is positive if cαα = 0 or
c(D, i) = D2 +Di. When the best response function is linear, it must be i∗(Π) = aΠ− b, where a = 1Π1−Π0
and b = Π0Π1−Π0 by conditions (3) and (4). Note that the slope a is bigger than 1. And Π
∗
l =
Π0
1+Π0−Π1 solves
i∗(Π∗l ) = Π∗l .
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(1, 1), where Π∗ ∈ [Π0,Π1] ⊂ (0, 1). Among them (0, 0) and (1, 1) are stable.
The benchmark case is illustrated by figure 1. The interior NE (Π∗,Π∗) is unstable,
happening only when the initial belief is exactly Π∗. If the initial belief is ε2 lower than
Π∗, this economy will ultimately fall into ‘no-trust’ trap (Π = 0, π = 0). On the contrary,
if the initial belief is ε2 higher than Π
∗, the economy will gradually reach ‘full trust’ state
(Π = 1, π = 1). So a negligible ε diﬀerence in initial beliefs may lead to two polar stable
equilibria (Putnam 1993). The intuition is that, when enough people (over the threshold Π∗)
invest in cooperative tendency, the associated positive externalities outweigh idiosyncratic
cost diﬀerences and make net returns positive for everybody, and vice versa. In other
words, nobody is diﬀerent enough in their investing costs to avoid being swept away by
others’ choices.
3.3.2 Diverse Cost Case
In contrast to the benchmark case, players here have quite diverse costs. Some have costs so
low that they would invest in cooperative tendency no matter how few players are expected
to do so. On the other hand, there are players whose costs are so high that they would not
invest even everybody else does so. This case is characterized by the following conditions.
limΠ→0+Vd(0,Π) > 0, (5)
Vd(1, 1) < 0. (6)
Let π0 be defined by limΠ→0+Vd(i∗(Π), 0) = 0 and π0 ≡ limΠ→0+i∗(Π); and π1 by Vd(i∗(1), 1) =
0 and π1 ≡ i∗(1). Conditions (5) and (6) are equivalent to π0 > 0 and π1 < 1, respectively.
That is, as long as the expected social trust is positive, there are at least π0 players choosing
to be cooperative; on the other hand, there are at most π1 cooperative players when the
expected social trust is one. The idiosyncratic diﬀerences in investment cost now outweigh
the externalities, making players less aﬀected by other people’s choices.
Proposition 7 Under conditions (5) and (6), there exist two NEs: (0, 0) and (Π∗,Π∗),
where Π∗ ∈ (π0, π1). Only (Π∗,Π∗) is stable.
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Ππ
0 1
1
Π∗
B(Π)
π0
π1
Figure 2: Diverse Cost Case
Proof. Similar arguments as in the benchmark case lead to the best response function
B(Π) = { 0 if Π = 0
i∗(Π) if Π ∈ (0, 1]
Let Π∗ ∈ (0, 1) denote the solution to i∗(Π∗) = Π∗, then Π∗ ∈ (π0, π1) is unique because
B(Π→ 0) = π0, B(Π = 1) = π1, and B(Π) strictly increases in Π ∈ (0, 1]. It is stable since
the slope of B(Π) is smaller than one when crossing the 450 line.15
This proposition shows that the interior NE (Π∗,Π∗) is the only focal point of the
history, which is determined by fundamental forces such as information and cost structures
and thus immune to random events. See figure 2 for illustration. The following comparative
statics suggest that long-run social trust increases in p, β and G (representing expected
returns of cooperative tendency), and decreases with defecting benefits d and l. These
results are also true for any interior stable equilibrium in other cases.
Proposition 8 ∂Π∗/∂p > 0, ∂Π∗/∂β > 0, ∂Π∗/∂G > 0; ∂Π∗/∂d < 0, ∂Π∗/∂l < 0.
Proof. To prove ∂Π∗/∂p > 0, we show that p shifts up the best response function B(Π)
for each Π ∈ (0, 1] and increases π0. Accordingly, the intersection of B(Π) with the 450 line,
15The linear best response function is i∗(Π) = cΠ+ d, where d = π0, c+ d = π1. Let i∗(Π∗l ) = Π∗l , we get
Π∗l = π01+π0−π1 .
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Figure 3: Low Cost Case
Π∗, must also increase with p.
∂B(Π)
∂p
=
∂i∗(Π)
∂p
= − ∂Vd(i
∗,Π)/∂p
∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
=
β[G+Πd+ (1−Π)l]
−∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
> 0,
By definition of π0, we know limΠ→0Vd(i = π0,Π) = βpG − β(1 − p)l − c(l, π0) = 0. By
Implicit Function Theorem, we get ∂π0∂p = −
β(G+l)
−ci > 0. The other four comparative statics
are proved similarly and thus are relegated to the appendix.
3.3.3 Low Cost and High Cost Cases
In the low cost case, even the highest indexed players invest in cooperative tendency when
they believe enough people are doing so. It is characterized by conditions (4) and (5) where
Π1 ∈ [0, 1]. Here full trust NE (1, 1) always exists and is stable. It is either the only
equilibrium, or there exist two other NEs at interior points where the one with lower social
trust is stable. See figure 3. The high cost case is defined by conditions (3) and (6) where
Π0 ∈ (0, 1]. The no-trust NE (0, 0) is stable. It may be unique, otherwise two interior NEs
also exist where the one with higher social trust is stable. See figure 4 for illustration. The
proof is omitted since it is similar to the first two cases.
Proposition 9 i) Multiple equilibrium are possible in all cases. However, among all NEs
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Figure 4: High Cost Case
with social trust levels in (0, 1), the stable one is unique. ii) Full trust is achievable in stable
NE when condition (4) is satisfied but never so when (6) holds. iii) ‘No trust’ equilibrium
always exists which is stable under condition (3).
The above proposition summarizes some common results of the above four cases. It
implies that low-cost players are crucial in generating positive social trust, and high-cost
players in achieving full trust. There exist multiple equilibrium where up to two of them are
stable. However, there is only one stable equilibrium with π ∈ (0, 1). Our discussions below
focus on this unique stable interior equilibrium with relevant comparative statics specified
in Proposition 8.
3.4 Several Ways to Increase Social Trust
3.4.1 The Information Structure
An individual’s trustworthiness sometimes can be assessed from his appearance, attitudes,
and spontaneous responses (Frank 1987). It is also revealed by his actions in one-period
prisoner’s dilemmas (section 2). The accuracy of this encoding process often increases
with one’s knowledge and experiences, and decreases with the heterogeneity of partners’
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backgrounds. Indeed, subjects paired with a partner of a diﬀerent race or nationality are
less cooperative in public goods experiments (Glaeser et al. 2000), and people show lower
trust in a less homogenous community (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).
The information structure in a society is represented by p in our simple social trust
formation model. Better information flow through eﬃcient mass communication and dense
social networks help facilitate the revelation of cooperative tendencies and thus lead to
higher p, since more information can be accumulated about how to assess people’s trustwor-
thiness in certain circumstances and about specific individuals’ behaviors. Correspondingly
the amount of social trust is increased in a stable equilibrium (Proposition 8). This result
helps explain the following empirical findings. Temple and Johnson (1998) show that social
trust is positively correlated with both daily newspaper circulation (0.73) and the number
of radios per capita (0.53) across 29 countries. They conclude that “an assessment of mass
communications, given the absence of other good measures, is probably the best way of
capturing variation in social trust across developing countries.” Putnam (1995) shows that
weakened social networks may have contributed to the steady decline of social trust in US.16
3.4.2 Extrinsic Incentives and Intrinsic Discipline
Game-specific payoﬀs in prisoner’s dilemmas such as d and l represent extrinsic incentives
to defect. They are determined by disciplinary institutions including the legal system, firm
incentive and monitoring schemes, social networks and social norms. The more eﬀective
these institutions are in punishing defecting behaviors, the lower d and l, which leads to
higher social trust in stable equilibrium by Proposition 8.
In contrast, the cooperative tendency is an intrinsic discipline against defecting. The
developing process of cooperative tendency is primarily conducted at home and in schools
during one’s childhood. When the investment costs are reduced or expected returns are in-
creased, people would invest more in cooperative tendencies. For example, among children
16 It is helpful to note that the information structure is quite diﬀerent across countries. Social networks are
dense in most developing countries so that diﬀerence in mass communication has more explanatory power. In
developed countries, however, mass communication is usually eﬀective, while the density of social networks
may vary a lot.
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of poor family backgrounds those who attended early intervention programs such as Head-
start are more likely than others to adopt pro-social behaviors (Heckman, 1999; Garces,
Duncan, and Currie, 2002). Higher time preference β and larger gain G from established
cooperative matches increase benefits of being cooperative, where G is higher when coop-
erative partners can sustain longer tenures in families, firms, and communities (Putnam
1995).
Both extrinsic incentives and intrinsic discipline can aﬀect people’s behaviors. To achieve
cooperation we can either improve the eﬃciency of institutions, or increase the net returns
of cooperative tendency, or both. How to allocate resources between them depends on their
relative costs. When the cooperative tendency is endogenous, however, their relationship
is more complex than simple substitution, since outside disciplines may crowd out innate
ones.17
Proposition 10 Eﬀective disciplinary institutions lead to lower average cooperative ten-
dency.
Proof. The average cooperative tendency in equilibrium α= Π∗d+ (1−Π∗)l increases
with d and l because
∂α
∂d
= Π∗ + (d− l)∂Π
∗
∂d
> 0,
∂α
∂l
= (1−Π∗) + (d− l)∂Π
∗
∂l
> 0.
Eﬀective disciplinary institutions, by reducing d and l, induce players to choose lower α.
The intuition is that eﬀective disciplinary institutions reduce defecting benefits and thus
the threshold cooperative tendencies, which makes investment appealing to more people. As
a result the proportion of cooperative people (the amount of social trust) is higher. When
the disciplinary institutions are less eﬀective, people have to invest in higher cooperative
tendencies to achieve cooperation. So fewer people are cooperative, but these cooperative
ones are able to withstand the temptation of larger defecting benefits. This result suggests
17SeeBar-Gill and Fershtman (2000), Frey, Bohnet and Huck (2001) for more examples of motivation
crowding-out.
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that survey-based trust indicator TRUST is higher in a country with more eﬀective disci-
plinary institutions, but experiment-based social trust measure may be lower if subjects are
faced with quite high defecting benefits. It may account for the contradictory social trust
ranking across countries. For example, TRUST in the UK (44.4) is much higher than Italy
(26.3) (Knack and Keefer 1997), but UK subjects “free-rode to a much greater extent” than
Italians in a public goods experiment (Burlando and Hey 1997). A similar comparison is
U.S. (TRUST=45.4) v.s. Germany (TRUST=29.8), where U.S. subjects free-rode more
than Germans (Weimann 1994).
3.5 An Extension with Human Capital
The cooperative tendency, a trait invested in a person that yields future returns to him/her,
is essentially a component of human capital.18 It is distinct from cognitive ability h, the
conventional component of human capital, in that h directly enters a specific production
function, while cooperative tendency enables people to use h properly by cooperating with
each other. These two components together (h,α) determine a person’s overall productivity;
while at investment stage, their relationship is similar to that between a child’s cognitive
and social development. In this section the basic social trust formation model is extended
with cognitive ability investment. Since almost all previous results carry over, we only
discuss diﬀerences and new findings. The proofs for the following two propositions and the
human capital version of Lemma 2 are in the appendix.
18 In the same spirit, some personal characteristics such as working attitude, self-discipline, motivation,
and time preference are treated as components of human capital by Becker (1996), Bowles and Gintis (1998),
Heckman (2000), Bowles et al. (2001), and OECD (2001).
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3.5.1 Human Capital Version of the Stage Game
The payoﬀs of player i depend on his human capital (hi, αi). The game γh, the human
capital version of the prisoner’s dilemma between players i and j, is
Player j
Player i
C D
C g(hi), g(hj) −l(hi), g(hj) + d(hj)− αj
D g(hi) + d(hi)− αi, −l(hj) −αi, −αj
The production functions g(·), d(·), l(·) increase and are concave in h, where d(h) < l(h)
and g(h) + d(h)− l(h) > 0 for all h, corresponding to assumptions (1) and (2). When both
players defect they produce the default amount which is again normalized to zero.
Under complete information, player i is of selfish type iﬀ αi < d(hi), selfless iﬀ αi ≥ l(hi),
reciprocal iﬀ αi ∈ [d(hi), l(hi)). Under incomplete information, player i cooperates iﬀ
αi ≥ α(hi, π), where α(hi, π) ≡ πd(hi)+(1−π)l(hi). These two results are direct extensions
of Proposition 2 and 3, respectively. Note that the threshold cooperative tendency in a game
increases with a player’s cognitive ability h, i.e. ∂α(hi,Π)/∂hi ≥ 0, since players with higher
h can produce higher defecting benefits.
3.5.2 Human Capital Investment Model
The timing and information structure in this human capital investment model is the same as
the basic model, except that now players have to choose (h, α) together. The cost function
is c(h,α, i), where h, α ∈ R+, i ∈ [0, 1], c(0, 0, i) = 0, ch > 0, cα > 0, ci > 0, chh ≥ 0,
cαα ≥ 0, cαi > 0. Let V iA(h) denote the expected life-time utility for player i when he
becomes cooperative, and V iM(h) if otherwise. We have
V iA(h) = βpG(h) + β(1− p)[Πg(h)− (1−Π)l(h)]− c(h, α(h,Π), i),
V iM(h) = β(1− p)Π(g(h) + d(h))− c(h, 0, i).
Let hiA ≡ hA(Π, p, β, i, k) and hiM ≡ hM(Π, p, β, i, k) denote the solutions that maximize
V iA(h) and V iM(h) respectively, where k represents all other parameters. Their existence and
relevant comparative statics are summarized in the following lemma.
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Figure 5: Relation Between hiA and hM
Lemma 4 hiA and hiM exist and are unique. hiM increases in Π but decreases in p. hiA
increases with p, and also in Π if chα(h, α(h,Π), i) ≥ 0 and d0(h) ≤ l0(h).
To study the eﬀects of cooperative tendency on cognitive ability, we assume the marginal
cost of investing in h is the same across players, i.e. chi(h, α, i) = 0. Meanwhile we maintain
the same assumption cαi(h, α(h), i) > 0 as before.
Proposition 11 i) For any given Π, hiA strictly decreases with i, while hiM = hM holds for
all players. ii) There exists a unique i(Π, p) ∈ [0, 1] such that hiA ≥ hM for all i ≤ i, while
hiA < hM for all i > i. i(Π, p) increases with p and Π.
This proposition, illustrated by figure 5, demonstrates the interaction between the two
components of human capital. Players would choose the same cognitive ability hM if not
investing in cooperative tendency, since their marginal costs are the same. If they invest in
cooperative tendency, lower cost (i ≤ i) players would choose higher cognitive abilities than
hM , while high cost ones (i > i) the opposite. Therefore cognitive ability and cooperative
tendency complement (substitute) each other for low (high) cost players. As p or Π goes
up, they become complements for more people.
26
4 Conclusions
Social trust is an important social phenomenon which has been extensively studied by so-
cial scientists (see for example Cook 2001). Empirical work in the economics literature
has shown that it facilitates economic performance at various levels. This paper formalizes
the concepts of trustworthiness, trust, and social trust based on a single analytical element
‘cooperative tendency’; and studies the formation of social trust in a society using a model
of human capital investment. It provides plausible explanation for many empirical and ex-
perimental results about social trust. For example, the same player may exhibit diﬀerent
levels of trustworthiness across games, which in part leads to discrepancies among empirical
measures of social trust (Glaeser et al. 2000); trust is lower among people with less homoge-
nous backgrounds (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) and it is positively correlated with mass
media and social networks (Temple and Johnson 1998, Putnam 1995)); social trust level is
significantly associated with economic performance (Knack and Keefer 1997), especially in
large organizations where people often do not know each other well (La Porta et al. 1997);
long-run social trust levels may be quite diﬀerent in otherwise identical groups (Putnam
1993).
The paper also generates fresh insights and policy implications about social trust, es-
pecially on its relationship with human capital and disciplinary institutions. For instance,
cultivating cooperative tendency is important to social trust and economic performance,
and it may complement investment in cognitive skills. But individuals lack appropriate
incentives to develop cooperative tendencies due to strong positive externalities. These
results suggest that changes should be made to current human capital policies which “...fo-
cus on cognitive skills ... to the exclusion of social skills, self-discipline and a variety of
non-cognitive skills that are known to determine success in life”(Heckman 1999), especially
when the under-investment in appropriate working habits and attitudes has already aﬀected
many firms (Cappelli 1995).
Furthermore, establishing institutions to curb defecting should be optimally weighed
against cultivating cooperative tendencies, taking into consideration the dynamic interac-
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tions between them. For example, criminal rates could be reduced either by more policing
or by helping more children through Headstart or similar programs (Garces, Duncan, and
Currie, 2002); in a firm both its incentives/monitoring scheme and the social trust among
employees can increase total eﬀort. More analysis is needed to understand the dynamic
relationship between social trust and institutions.
The paper also sheds light on the relationship between various forms of social capital. For
example, social networks and norms not only interact with current social trust in promoting
cooperation through reputation eﬀects, but may also aﬀect future social trust formation. On
the other hand, social trust is likely to play a crucial role in the creation and maintenance
of these social capital forms as long as discrepancies between social and individual returns
are involved. A more thorough treatment is left for future research.
28
References
1. Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara, “Who Trusts Others?” Journal of Public
Economics, August 2002, 85:207-34.
2. Andreoni, J. and R. Croson (2002), “Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching
in Public Goods Experiments,” forthcoming in Handbook of Experimental Economics
Results.
3. Arrow, K. (1972), “Gift and Exchanges,” Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, I (1972),
p343-62.
4. Bar-Gill, O., and C. Fershtman (2000), “The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous
Preferences,” working paper, Aug. 2000.
5. Becker, G. (1996) Accounting for Tastes, Harvard University Press.
6. Bohnet, Iris, Bruno Frey, and Steﬀen Huck, “More Order with Less Law: On Contract
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No.
1, March 2001: 131-144.
7. Bowles, S., and H. Gintis (1998) “The Determinants of Individual Earnings: Cognitive
Skills, Personality, and Schooling,” working paper.
8. Bowles, S., H. Gintis, and M. Osborne (2001) “The Determinants of Earnings: A
Behavioral Approach,” Journal of Economics Literature, Vol. XXXIX (Dec. 2001),
pp 1137-1176.
9. Burlando, R., and J.D. Hey (1997), “Do Anglo-Saxons Free-ride More?” Journal of
Public Economics 64 (1997) 41-60.
10. Cappelli, P. (1995), “Is the ‘Skill Gap’ Really About Attitudes?” California Manage-
ment Review Vol. 37, No.4, Summer 1995.
11. Coleman, J.S., “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal
of Sociology 94 (1988): S95-S120.
12. Cook, Karen S. (2001), editor, Trust in Society, New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2001.
13. Cripps, Martin, George Mailath, and Larry Samuelson (2003), "Imperfect Monitoring
and Impermanent Reputations" Econometrica, forthcoming.
14. Dixit, Avinash, "On Modes of Economic Governance," Econometrica, 71(2), March
2003, 449-481.
15. Fehr, E. and S. Gachter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reci-
procity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 159-182.
16. Frank, Robert H. (1987), “If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Func-
tion, Would He Want One With a Conscience?" American Economic Review, 77 No.
4, 593-604.
17. Frey, B.S. and F. Oberholtzer-Gee (1997), “The Cost of Price Incentives: an Empirical
Analysis of Motivation Crowding Out,” The American Economic Review 87, 746-755.
18. Garces, Eliana; Thomas, Duncan; Currie, Janet, “Longer-Term Eﬀects of Head Start,”
American Economic Review, September 2002, v. 92, iss. 4, pp. 999-1012.
29
19. Glaeser, E.L., David Laibson, and Bruce Sacerdote (2000), “The Economic Approach
to Social Capital,” NBER working paper 7728.
20. Glaeser, E.L., David Laibson, J.A. Scheinkman, and C.L. Soutter (2000), “Measuring
Trust,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug. 2000.
21. Hardin, Russell. (2002), Trust and Trustworthiness, New York: Russell Sage Founda-
tion.
22. Heckman, James J. (1999), “Policies to Foster Human Capital,” NBERWorking Paper
7288, August 1999.
23. James, Harvey S. (2002), “The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries into
the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Orga-
nization, 47(3), pp. 291-307.
24. Kandel, E. and Lazear, E.P., 1992. “Peer pressure and partnerships,” Journal of
Political Economy 100 4, pp. 801—817.
25. Knack, S., and P. Keefer (1997), “ Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoﬀ?
A Cross-Country Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII (1997), 1251-
1288.
26. Kreps, D.(1997), “Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives,” American Economic
Review, May 1997.
27. Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982) “Rational Cooperation in
the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 27:
p245-52.
28. La Porter, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, “Trust in Large
Organizations,” American Economic Review, May 1997.
29. OECD (2001), The Well-being of Nations: the Role of Human and Social Capital,
Paris.
30. Palfrey, T.R. and J.E. Prisbrey, “Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments:
How Much and Why?”, The American Economic Review, 1997, 87/5, 829-846.
31. Putnam, R. D. (1993) (with R. Leonardi and R.Y. Nanetti),Making Democracy Work,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
32. Putnam, R. D. (1995), “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal
of Democracy, Vol.6 (1995), pp. 65-78.
33. Rob, R., and P. Zemsky (2002), “Social Capital, Corporate Culture and the Incentive
Intensity,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 No. 2, Summer 2002.
34. Rotemberg, J. J. (1994), “Human Relations in the Workplace.” Journal of Political
Economy 102 (August 1994): 684-718.
35. Temple, J. and P.A. Johnson (1998), “Social Capability and Economic Growth,”Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, August,1998.
36. Tirole, J. (1996), “A Theory of Collective Reputations,” Review of Economic Studies
(1996) 63, 1-22.
37. Weimann, J. (1994), ‘Individual Behavior in a Free Riding Experiment,” Journal of
Public Economics 54, 185-200.
30
Appendix
• Proof for Proposition 4.
Proof. Given the belief system, non-selfish players would not deviate by the same
arguments in Proposition 3 and 2. At period T , playing D is a selfish player’s dominant
strategy, so he will not deviate. If he deviates in some period t < T by playing D, his selfish
type is revealed. According to the equilibrium strategies, (D,D) would be played in all
future periods unless his partner is selfless in which case (C,D) is played. So the deviation
payoﬀ for a selfish player from period t until T is (g+d)βt−1+(g+d)(βt+βt+1+...+βT−1)πSI .
By not deviating he can get gβt−1+gβt+...+gβT−2+(g+d)πβT−1 = gβt−1(1−βT−t+1)/(1−
β) + dπβT−1. The non-deviation condition at period t for a selfish player is
[g − (g + d)πS]
β(1− βT−t−1)
1− β + (g + d)(π − πS)β
T−t > d
The LHS is the net gain of cooperation at time t. Its partial derivation with respect to t is
∂LHS
∂t
= [g − (g + d)πS ]
βT−t lnβ
1− β − (g + d)(π − πS)β
T−t lnβ
=
−βT−t lnβ
1− β (g + d)[π −
g
g + d
− (π − πS)β],
which is negative if
β ≥ (π − g
g + d
)/(π − πS). (7)
That is, if players are patient enough, they would wait until later to deviate, since deviation
becomes more attractive as time goes by. In other words, if a selfish player does not deviate
at period T − 1, then they will not deviate at any time earlier. Non-deviation at period
T − 1 means
(g + d)βT−2 + (g + d)βT−1πS < gβT−2 + (g + d)πβT−1
⇒ β > d
(g + d)(π − πS)
. (8)
It is easy to check that condition (7) is implied by condition (8) because π < 1. So that
condition (8) guarantees that selfish players will not want to deviate at any time. To
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make sure that there is such β, d(g+d)(π−πS) must be smaller than 1, which implies that
π − πS > dg+d .
We have proved that the strategy profile is sequentially rational w.r.t. the belief system.
Now we show that the belief system is fully consistent given the strategy profile. In the first
period and any period with history that only (C,C) has played, the probability of matching
with a non-selfish partner is equal to π since the match is random and all behave in the
same way. If in some period (C,D) is observed, the player who plays D must be selfish
since D is never a best response for a non-selfish player when his partner plays C. The
probability of the player who plays C in (C,D) being non-selfish is still π because both
types could have done so according to the equilibrium strategy profile.
• Proof for Proposition 8.
Proof. Given any Π ∈ [Π0,Π1], by implicit function theorem, we get from the equation
Vd(i∗,Π) = β[pG− (1− p)(Πd+ (1−Π)l)]− c(D, i∗) = 0 that
∂B(Π)
∂d
=
∂i∗(Π)
∂d
= − ∂Vd(i
∗,Π)/∂d
∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
=
−(β(1− p) + cD)Π
−∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
< 0.
Using exactly the same techniques, we get
∂B(Π)
∂l
=
−(β(1− p) + cD)(1−Π)
−∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
< 0,
∂B(Π)
∂β
=
pG− (1− p)(Πd+ (1−Π)l)
−∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
> 0,
∂B(Π)
∂G
=
βp
−∂Vd(i∗,Π)/∂i∗
> 0.
Again by implicit function theorem, we get from limΠ→0Vd(i = π0,Π) = βpG− β(1− p)l−
c(l, π0) = 0 the following results ∂π0∂d = 0,
∂π0
∂l = −
−β(1−p)−cl
−ci < 0,
∂π0
∂β = −
pG−(1−p)l
−ci > 0,
and ∂π0∂G = −
βp
−ci > 0.
• Proof for Proposition 9.
Proof. i) The suﬃcient condition for unique NE is ∂2B(Π)/∂Π2 ≤ 0, or when
∂2B(Π)/∂Π2 > 0 and Π1 ≤ π0 both hold. ii) A suﬃcient condition for unique NE is
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∂2B(Π)/∂Π2 ≥ 0. Another one is ∂2B(Π)/∂Π2 < 0 and Π0 ≤ π1. The proof is otherwise
similar to the first two cases and omitted.
• Proof for Lemma 4.
Proof. (1) The Existence of Unique Solutions hiA and hiM .
The objective functions are
V iA(h) = β(1− p)[Πg(h)− (1−Π)l(h)] + βpG(h)− c(h, α(h,Π), i),
V iM(h) = β(1− p)Π[g(h) + d(h)]− c(h, 0, i).
The FOC of V iM for an interior solution is,
[V iM(h)]0 = β(1− p)Π[g0(h) + d0(h)]− ch(h, 0, i) = 0 (9)
Since g00(h) ≤ 0, d00(h) ≤ 0, and chh(h, α, i) > 0, we know that [V iM(h)]0 is a decreasing
function of h. If we assume that
lim
h→0
ch(h, 0, i) = 0, lim
h→0
g0(h) > 0, (A1)
we get limh→0 V i0M(h, 0) > 0. So there is a unique solution hiM = hM(Π, p, β, T, i, k) ≥ 0
such that V i0M(hiM) = 0, where k represents all other parameters.
The FOC of V iA for an interior solution is,
[V iA(h)]0 = β(1− p)[Πg0(h)− (1−Π)l0(h)] + βpG0(h)−
∂c(h, α(h,Π))
∂h
= 0. (10)
The second derivative of value function V iA(h) w.r.t. to h is
[V iA(h)]00 = β(1− p)[Πg00(h)− (1−Π)l00(h)] + βpG00(h)−
∂2c(h, α(h,Π))
∂h2
.
A suﬃcient condition for the second order condition to hold is
l00(h) = 0, and
∂2c(h, α(h,Π),Π)
∂h2
≥ 0. (A2)
To guarantee a non-negative solution, we have to assume that [V iA(h = 0)]0 ≥ 0, which
requires the boundary condition
lim
h→0
∂c(h, α(h,Π))
∂h
= 0, lim
h→0
[βpG0(h) + β(1− p)(Π(g0(h) + l0(h))− l0(h))] > 0. (A1’)
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Under these two conditions, we can get a unique solution hiA = hA(Π, p, β, T, i, k).
(2) Comparative Statics for hiA and hM w.r.t. Π for any i ∈ [0, 1].
∂hM
∂Π
= −∂
2[V iM(h)]
∂Π∂h
/
∂2[V iM(h)]
∂h2
= −β(1− p)[g0(h) + d0(h)]/∂
2[V iM(h)]
∂h2
> 0.
∂hiA
∂Π
= −∂
2[V iA(h)]
∂Π∂h
/
∂2[V iA(h)]
∂h2
= −[β(1− p)(g0(h) + l0(h))− ∂c(h, α(h,Π), i)
∂h∂Π
]/
∂2V iA(h)
∂h2
> 0,
if ∂c(h,α(h,Π),i)∂h∂Π ≤ 0 holds. Given that
∂c(h, α(h,Π), i)
∂h∂Π
= [chα(h, α(h,Π), i) + cαα(h, α(h,Π), i)αh(h,Π)](d(h)− l(h))
+cα(h, α(h,Π), i)(d0(h)− l0(h)),
a suﬃcient condition is
chα(h, α(h,Π), i) ≥ 0, d0(h) ≤ l0(h). (A3)
(3) Comparative Statics for hiA and hM for any i ∈ [0, 1] w.r.t. p
∂hM
∂p
= −∂
2V iM(h)
∂p∂h
/
∂2[V iM(h)]
∂h2
= 0,
∂hiA
∂p
= −∂
2V iA(h)
∂p∂h
/
∂2[V iA(h)]
∂h2
= −β(G0(h)−Πg0(h) + (1−Π)l0(h))/∂
2V iA(h)
∂h2
> 0,
since Π(1− p)(g0(h) + l0(h)) + pG0(h)− l0(h) > 0 at hiA by condition (10).
• Proof for Proposition 11.
Proof. (1) The Relation Between hiM and h
j
M , h
i
A and h
j
A for any i, j,∈ [0, 1].
Since [V iM(h)]0 = 0 by condition (9), we use the Implicit Function Theorem and get
∂hiM
∂i
= −∂[V
i
M(h)]0
∂i
/
∂[V iM(h)]0
∂h
=
∂ch(h, 0, i)
∂i
/
−∂2V iM(h)
∂h2
T 0,
iﬀ ∂chi(h, 0, i) S 0. Similarly from [V iA(h)]0 = 0 we get
∂hiA
∂i
= −∂[V
i
A(h)]0
∂i
/
∂[V iA(h)]0
∂h
=
∂2c(h,α(h,Π), i)
∂h∂i
/
∂2V iA(h)
∂h2
T 0,
iﬀ ∂2c(h, α(h,Π), i)/∂h∂i = chi(h, α(h,Π), i) + cαi(h, α(h,Π), i)αh(h,Π) S 0. Under the
following assumption,
chi(h, 0, i) = 0, chi(hiA, α(hiA,Π), i) = 0, cαi(h, α(h), i) > 0, (A4)
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hiM = hM holds for any i ∈ [0, 1], and hiA > h
j
A for any i < j ∈ [0, 1].
(2) The Relation Between hiA and hM for any i ∈ [0, 1].
We know that [V iA(hiA)]0 = 0 and [V iA(hiA)]00 < 0. If we can show that [V iA(hM)]0 T 0,
then hiA T hM is proved. By condition (9), [V iM(h)]0 = 0, which is −βΠ(1 − p)[g0(hM) +
d0(hM)] + ch(hM , 0, i) = 0. Add this zero term to [V iA(hM)]0, we get
[V iA(hM)]0 = βpG0(hM)− β(1− p)[Πd0(hM) + (1−Π)l0(hM)]| {z }
A(Π)
−[∂c(hM , α(hM ,Π), i)/∂hM − ch(hM , 0, i)]| {z } .
B(i,Π)
≡ A(Π)−B(i,Π). (11)
The first term A(Π), the gain of investing in α, is the same for all players. The second term
B(i,Π) is the investing cost for player i, which increases with player index since
∂B(i,Π)/∂i = cαi(hM , α(hM ,Π), i)αh(hM ,Π) > 0.
If the boundary condition [V 0A(hM)]0 ≥ 0 ≥ [V 1A(hM)]0 holds given Π and p, i.e. if
B(1,Π) ≥ A(Π) ≥ B(0,Π), (A5)
there must exist a unique i(Π, p) ∈ [0, 1] such that
[V iA(hM)]0 = A(Π)−B(¯ı,Π) = 0. (12)
This condition means that for player i, his optimal choice hiA is equal to hM , not aﬀected
by his choice of α. Then for all i ≤ i, we have [V iA(hM)]0 > 0 ⇐⇒ hiA ≥ hM ; for all i > i,
[V iA(hM)]0 < 0 ⇐⇒ hiA < hM . If A(Π) ≥ B(1,Π), then hiA ≥ hM for all i; on the other
hand, if A(Π) < B(0,Π), the opposite is true. See figure below for illustration.
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hM
hA(0)
hA(i)
A(Π)
B(i, Π)
Now we check the sign of ∂i∂Π based on equation (12).
∂i(Π, p)
∂Π
= −∂V
i
A(hM)/∂h∂Π
∂V iA(hM)/∂h∂i
=
∂V iA(hM)/∂h∂Π
cαi(hM , α(hM ,Π), i)αh(hM ,Π)
> 0.
Similarly we have ∂i(Π, p)/∂p = β2G0(hM)/cαi(hM , α(hM ,Π), i)αh(hM ,Π) > 0.
• Proof for Lemma 2 (Human Capital Version).
Proof. By the Envelope Theorem,
∂Vd(i,Π)
∂i
≡ ∂V
i
A(hiA)− ∂V iM(hM)
∂i
= −[ci(hiA, α(hiA,Π), i)− ci(hM , 0, i)] < 0.
∂Vd(i,Π)
∂Π
= β(1− p)[g(hiA) + l(hiA) − g(hM)− d(hM)]
+cα(hiA, α(hiA,Π), i)[l(hiA)− d(hiA)]
It is obvious that ∂Vd(i,Π)/∂Π > 0 when hiA ≥ hM , which is true for low index players. If
we can show that ∂Vd(i,Π)∂Π decreases with player index, then ∂Vd(i,Π)/∂Π > 0 for all players.
Indeed this is the case since ∂
2Vd(i,Π)
∂Π∂i = ciα(h
i
A, α(hiA,Π), i)[l(hiA)−d(hiA)+αh∂hiA/∂Π] > 0.
The intuition is that high cost players get more benefits from reduced α(hiA,Π) due to a
higher Π.
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